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Political Economy of the Electricity Subsidy
Evidence from Punjab
The electricity subsidy distribution pattern needs to be scrutinised to assess whether
the policy benefits small producers, a normative argument often made while granting any
input subsidy. In Punjab, this policy is found to ignore equity considerations while granting
non-discriminatory electricity subsidies to the agricultural sector. This study highlights
the existence of disparities in the flow of electricity subsidy between the advanced
and backward regions. While the medium and large farmers reap the major benefits of
the subsidy, the poor small farmers, especially in the backward areas, remain excluded
due to their non-possession of electricity connections. In a nutshell, this paper
questions the justification for introducing such a policy and puts forward the
case for user charges based on open access to electricity.
VARINDER JAIN
fronts. But, the experience of these economies has been quite
opposite. Schultz (1964) considers the traditional economic
structure as the main hindrance to their growth. However, he
argues that these economies can raise agricultural productivity
by adopting quality inputs and applying the advances in knowl-
edge and technology to a broad range of productive activities.
Following Schultz, the first step should be to identify a technique
of production capable of raising productivity at least cost to
society. The Indian planners recognised this in the mid-1960s
and attempts were made to raise agricultural productivity by
adopting modern techniques of production. Such effort brought
amazing results1 by transforming food-deficit India into a food-
surplus India. Among other intermediate inputs, the provision
of adequate irrigation contributed significantly towards the success
of this package of modern inputs.2 In fact, irrigation remained
a basic input on which the use of high-yielding variety (HYV)
seeds, fertilisers, etc, depended significantly.
Irrigation is an important element of infrastructure. Here, the
state3 should play an active role as its provision involves market
failure.4 The state cannot play its role independently, rather its
policies are affected by the intentions of various interest groups.
These interest groups compete with each other to get a share of
the state resources and privileges. They also bargain with the
state, on the basis of their voting power, for more benefits and
services [Becker 1983; Osborne and Silvinski 1996]. Kalecki
(1967) points out that the state in developing countries is ruled
by a class that rose to power upon independence after the
second world war. This class is mainly the lower middle class
and the rich peasantry. This type of state is subject to
the pressure of interest group politics. In the Indian context,
Bardhan expresses the view of state being the “inter-
mediary”, completely subordinated to pressures and pulls of
interest groups as:
The Indian economy has thus become an elaborate network of
patronage and subsidies. The heterogeneous interest groups fight
and bargain for their share in the spoils of the system and often
strike compromises in the form of “log-rolling” in the usual form
of pressure-group politics [as quoted in Ghosh 1995:176].
It reflects the subordination of the state in the intermediate
regimes. The new political economy considers elected leaders
as the agents who are always interested in remaining in power
The provision of agricultural subsidies has burdened Punjab’sexchequer heavily. In such a situation, it is worth exploringwhether the state’s scarce resources are reaching the
deserving groups. These input subsidies, on normative grounds,
are provided either to raise production and productivity levels
or to encourage small and marginal producers for adopting
modern inputs. The inputs like electricity have cornered a sig-
nificant share of agricultural subsidies in developing countries
like India where the state, under the influence of pressure politics,
ignores the economic lens to target beneficiaries, rather it adopts
non-discriminatory policies to grant these subsidies. Such policies
while benefiting the rich have compensated the poor inadequately.
This paper focuses on this aspect of state policy. It, among
other things, puts forward a policy action to benefit the non-
beneficiaries. The first section focuses on the interest groups’
politics and state’s submission towards fulfilling their aspirations.
It is followed by a brief review of available evidence on distri-
bution patterns of various agricultural subsidies in the second
section. The third section presents the distribution patterns of
the electricity subsidy in Punjab. This evidence on electricity
subsidy distribution is based on a primary survey. The state’s
inclination towards polarisation of electricity subsidy benefits
is discussed in the fourth section. The fifth section highlights
the demerits of polarising the subsidy benefits and thereby urges
the need for a policy action. The scope for the policy change
is explored in the sixth section. The seventh section considers
the merits of this policy change to the farmers and the final section
summarises the study.
I
State, Interest Groups and the Politics
of Subsidies
The agricultural sector is the mainstay of today’s dualistic
developing economies that, in Rostow’s (1960) terms, is yet to
take-off. This sector is expected to facilitate the growth process
by providing raw materials for industry, ensuring adequate food
supply, acting as a market for industrial goods, releasing labour
for industrial use, generating savings, etc. Obviously, due to the
constraint posed by the relatively fixed supply of land, it can
perform on these expected lines only by gaining on productivity
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and deriving rent by providing access to public goods, services
and regulations. They have no principled position on any issue
and generally take such policy actions that suit the whims of their
vote banks and thus, in turn, increase their chance of staying in
power [Dasgupta 1997]. It became evident in India when farmers
– a large interest group in agricultural states – formed their unions
and started participating actively in the electoral politics to
pressurise the ruling parties to fulfil their demands. The political
parties responded positively and introduced such policies that
were quite uneconomic at their very outset. One such policy
introduction is related with the supply of electricity to the
agricultural sector for irrigation purposes. Dubash and Rajan
(2001) point out that the first use of electricity subsidy as a
political tool may have occurred during the 1977 elections when
the Congress-led Andhra Pradesh offered flat-rate tariffs to farmers
as an election promise to help. A similar event happened in Punjab
where electricity was supplied without collecting any user charge
in the second-half of the 1990s. This practice of selling electricity
at the subsidised rates to the agricultural sector reveals nothing
but the state’s submission to interest group politics. These policies
have been, by and large, non-discriminatory in nature. It has had
a bearing on the distribution pattern of subsidies but before
exploring the distribution pattern of electricity subsidy in Punjab,
it would be better to review the available empirical evidence on
the distribution pattern of agricultural subsidies.
II
Distribution of Agricultural Subsidies in India:
Available Evidence
Agricultural subsidies, in Indian context, have attracted a lot
of attention of researchers in recent past and consequently a vast
literature on this issue has emerged. This literature can be classified
broadly as over estimation, analysis, impact and distribution of
subsidies. Here, we will discuss, in brief, the available evidence
on distribution patterns of agricultural subsidies. There are studies
evaluating the impact of incentive policies comprising various
subsidies on rural development programmes [Subbarao 1985],
questioning the justification for the continuation of a fertiliser
subsidy [Namboodiri 1982], exploring inter-regional disparities
in the use of agricultural subsidies [Singh and Chand 1986] and
so on. There are also studies like Reddy (1992) analysing dis-
tribution of agricultural subsidies. This study found that the
subsidies were benefiting more the small farmers than the large
ones. But in the case of electricity subsidy, it found the large
farmers as major beneficiaries. In line with this study, other
studies like Karnik and Lalvani (1996), Howes and Murgai (2003)
pointed out that a large chunk of the electricity subsidy goes to
large and medium farmers whereas small farmers remain at large
the non-beneficiaries.
But, we cannot take this evidence as such. It needs a re-
consideration because the electricity subsidy for irrigation pur-
poses is different from the subsidies on other inputs. The acqui-
sition of this subsidy requires the possession of an electric
connection in the farm. The available evidence on the distribution
pattern of the electricity subsidy has ignored this peculiarity. One
should consider the direction of flow of subsidy benefits rather
than its magnitude5 because the magnitude is subject to change
depending upon the conditions of electricity supply. Also, from
the policy perspective, it is worth exploring the direction in which
the subsidy benefits are flowing. We have tried to explore the
flow of electricity subsidy benefits among different farmer classes
across the progressive and backward regions of Punjab.
III
Beneficiaries of Electricity Subsidy
In Punjab, interest group politics is quite active. Here, the
agrarian transformation has undergone three major phases: the
British colonial rule, the post-green revolution period and the
recent period when farmers’ organisations shifted from non-
electoral politics of pressure groups to participate actively in
electoral politics [Mukherji 1998]. In the latter phase, the pro-
vision of electricity subsidy by the state commands attention.6
The state pursued a non-discriminatory electricity subsidy policy.
The opportunity of getting benefits for any farmer, under such
a policy, depends a priori on her/his ability to own an electricity
connection, availability of electricity supply in her/his farm and
the nature of electricity supply. These factors may differ within
and across regions due to various factors. As no secondary data
source provides such micro level information, we have conducted
a primary survey in two districts7 viz, Mansa and Ludhiana to
make a comparative study of the flow of electricity subsidy to
different classes of the farmers. The basic idea behind this
exercise is to examine the generality of “bigger-getting-best”
evidence8 by relating farm size to electricity access and availability.
Survey Methodology
The sample size is of 300 farm households (200 general house-
holds and 100 households having connections under the own your
tubewell (OYT) scheme). We adopted the multistage sampling
technique to select this sample size. It involved three stages. First
of all, one district among each of the progressive and backward
districts of Punjab was identified on the basis of its achievements
in various socio-economic aspects of development. Following
this, a few villages9 were chosen from these districts. In the second
stage, the required sample size was selected through the “pro-
portionate sampling” method, for which the “operational land
Table 1: Distribution of Operational Landholdings
District <=4 Acres 4-10 Acres >10 Acres Total Acres
Bathinda 54536 37396 10343 102275
(53.22) (36.56) (10.12) (100)
Ludhiana 24031 20681 5560 83110
(68.42) (24.88) (6.69) (100)
Note: Before April 13, 1992, Mansa district was part of Bathinda district. As
the available data on operational landholding is for the year 1990-91,
so this data of Bathinda district has been assumed same for Mansa
district.
The figures in parentheses are the percentages of total acres.
Source: Agriculture Census (Punjab) 1990-91, printed in 2002 by the
government of Punjab.
Table 2: Electrified Irrigation Pump-set Ownership in the
Backward and Progressive Areas
Farmer Backward Area Progressive Area
Class Small Medium Large Total Small Medium Large Total
Yes 2 2 3 1 0 5 4 2 5 7
(3.7) (63.9) (100) 3 5 (79.4) (100) (100) 8 6
No 5 2 1 3 1 4
(96.3) (36.1) – 6 5 (20.6) – – 1 4
Total 5 4 3 6 1 0 100 6 8 2 5 7 100
Chi-Square
Test x2= 55.026, x20.05 = 5.991, x2= 7.661, x20.05 = 5.991,
d f = 2 d f = 2
Note: The figures in parentheses are percentages of farmers within their class.
Source : Primary survey.
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holding”10 data served as the base. We had classified farmers
with operational landholdings up to four acres, between four and
10 acres and above 10 acres as small, medium and large farmers,
respectively (Table 1). We further assumed the same classification
for selected villages in each district.
In the third stage, farmers’ particulars collected from village
‘patwari’11  provided the basis for the random selection of farm
households. After this, each household head was asked about the
number of acres of land that she/he at that time was cultivating.
This information facilitated the classification of selected house-
holds in the above categories. We followed this procedure till
the required sample size within each farmer class from each
selected village had been collected. While following this approach
of sample selection, we noticed a few households having conne-
ctions under the OYT scheme but we ignored such households
for the sake of maintaining uniformity in selected sample size.
The information of farmers having OYT connections was first
collected from the electricity sub-stations and after this, some
randomly selected households were surveyed in each village.
Survey Results
Presence of Electricity Connections
The presence of electricity connections in the farm is a pre-
requisite for having a access to electricity supply and hence
electricity subsidy. We found an association between the area and
the availability of electricity connections through a chi-square
test (Table 2). The regional gaps are large. The proportion of
farmers having electricity connections in the progressive area is
51 per cent higher than their counterparts in the backward area
(Figure 1). This disparity thus, leaves no room for questioning
the inference that a large quantum of electricity subsidy is flowing
to the progressive area. This inference is bound to hold true even
if there exist similar electricity supply conditions in both the areas.
The electricity connection ownership across these two districts,
when analysed in relation to different farmer classes, shows its
association with the farmer class (Table 2). The positions in both
progressive and backward areas are almost similar regarding
electricity connection ownership by medium and large farmers,
but there exist differences between the two regions in case of
small farmers. In the backward area, a very small proportion (3.7
per cent) of the farmers own electricity connections. In the
progressive area, it has been very high (i e, 79.4 per cent). It
can be noticed that unlike in the backward area, the farmers in
all the classes owned electricity connections in the progressive
area. This finding refutes the “bigger-getting-best” argument,
rather it highlights the incidence of “better placed-getting-best”.
Duration of Electricity Availability
The average duration of electricity availability on the farms
also has a bearing on the flow of electricity subsidy. The survey
results, by showing significant regional differences in duration
of electricity availability during both peak time (i e, the time of
sowing crops) and the off-peak time (i e, other times), indicate
that the progressive area receive priority over the backward one
in having a longer duration of electricity availability in the farm.
All the farmers in the progressive area have reported that they
are getting electricity for a minimum of eight hours during the
peak period though the perception of a majority (i e, about 83
per cent) falls at 10 hours. The situation, on the contrary, is much
different in the backward area where a majority of the farmers
reported electricity availability between six and eight hours
during this time. Here, a very small proportion of the farmers
reported the electricity availability for nine to 10 hours – equal
to that in the progressive area.
Though not equal to the peak period, an adequate availability
of electricity is also needed during the off-peak period as well
to ensure sufficient irrigation. There exist differences between
the two areas on this account too. A majority of the farmers in
the progressive area perceive electricity availability for eight
hours during the off-peak period. But in the backward area, only
51 per cent of the farmers are reported to have electricity
availability for five to six hours and all the farmers had an average
availability of electricity for a minimum of three hours during
this period. Such a difference in the availability of electricity
has had implications for per unit cost of irrigation.
Quality of Electricity Supply
The quantum of electricity subsidy flow is also related to its
quality as a greater flow of electricity subsidy can take place
only if the electric motors work efficiently. This efficient operation
of electric motors is dependent, to a large extent, upon the supply
of quality electricity. This quality of electricity supply can be
captured through its nature (i e, interrupted/uninterrupted) and
the frequency of voltage fluctuations (Table 3).
Even in this respect, the survey results indicate that there exists
an association between the area and the availability of quality
electricity. The majority of the farmers in the progressive area
reported they get uninterrupted electricity supply. At the same
time only 40 per cent of the farmers in the backward area perceive
the availability of such electricity. This means that in the backward
area, the share of farmers getting interrupted electricity supply
is quite high as compared to that in the progressive area. The
incidence of voltage fluctuations also affects the flow of subsidy.
Figure 1: Electricity Connection Holders in Punjab (Region-wise)
Table 3: Perceived Quality of Electricity Supply across Areas
Area Quality of Electricity Supply
Interrupted Electricity Supply Voltage Fluctuations
No Yes Total Frequent Moderate Rare Total
Progressive 77 9 86 3 30 53 86
(89.5) (10.5) (100) (3.5) (34.9) (61.6) (100)
Backward 14 21 35 20 11 4 35
(40.0) (60.0) (100) (57.1) (31.5) (11.4) (100)
Chi-Square
Test x2= 32.735, x20.05 = 3.841, d f = 1 x2= 51.070, x20.05 = 5.991, d f = 2
Note: The figures in parentheses are the percentages of total.
Source: Primary survey.
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We have found regional differences on this account too. In the
progressive area, a very small proportion of the farmers observed
frequent voltage fluctuations in electricity supply. But, the case
was quite opposite in the backward area where a high proportion
of the farmers perceived the presence of frequent and moderate
voltage fluctuations in the electricity supply – the share of those
reporting the frequent voltage fluctuations being the highest (i e,
57 per cent). Frequent voltage fluctuations damage electric motors.
This has had implications for farmer’s cost of production as the
repair of electric motor involves both huge monetary cost and
the opportunity cost of time. It also adds to unnecessary cost
burden by forcing farmers to use voltage stabilisers.12
IV
OYT Scheme: Polarisation of Subsidy Benefits
Inadequate subventions deteriorated the financial soundness of
the Punjab electricity board and following the state’s directions,
it had to initiate the OYT scheme by which it granted new
electricity connections to only those farmers willing to bear the
full cost. This new policy seems to be motivated by political
economy concerns. Underground water is a common resource
and everyone has the equal right to use it. But, it requires adequate
means at one’s disposal to harness this common resource that
is becoming a scarce commodity due to the fast pace of under-
ground water depletion [Bathla 1997]. The installation of new
electricity connection involves a huge cost. The small farmers,
who are not in a position to bear this cost, remain excluded from
claiming any benefit under this scheme. The large farmers, as
pointed out by our survey results, have cornered a major share
of electricity connections in both the areas. In the backward area,
a relatively high proportion (i e, 30 per cent) of medium farmers
got electricity connections under the OYT scheme. The economic
condition of these medium farmers in the backward area is
becoming very similar to those of the small farmers because of
declining agricultural productivity, frequent onslaught of floods,
burgeoning debts, etc. These farmers had visualised this scheme
as an  opportunity to get the electricity connection, as most of
them were not able to get it earlier either due to administrative
restrictions or favouritism, etc. Keeping in view the trade-off
between the dearer “diesel pump-set based” irrigation and free
“electricity based” irrigation, they considered the installation of
an electricity connection under this scheme as an asset. But, most
of these farmers having relatively lower levels of income could
not mobilise enough cash for the purchase of electricity connec-
tions and the banks were also not ready to provide them credit
for building this infrastructure on their farm.13 Consequently,
they had to either depend on non-institutional sources or sell their
assets. Such a practice of arranging resources reflects the nature
of state policy. It was well known beforehand to the state that
this scheme would either wipe out some classes of farmers or
would force them to finance the electricity connection through
the sale of assets. Similar has been the experience in the backward
area [Jain 2003]. This practice has facilitated the concentration
of land in few hands. This emerging trend of large inequalities
in landownership points towards the turn of the Punjab’s so-called
capitalistic agriculture to a system similar to the feudal one where
a few hands own the land and a large majority stays as landless,
paying rent to the lord to get access to cultivation on her/his land!
Another political economy aspect is related to difficulties in
getting the electricity connection. During the informal discus-
sions with the farmers, we found farmers dissatisfied with Punjab
state electricity board officials. Majority of the farmers had to
either make use of some political approach or bribe the concerned
staff of the electricity board to speed up the pace of getting
effective electricity connections on their farm. The incidence has
been relatively high in the backward area where all the farmers
had used some sort of influence to get an electricity connection.
The farmers have approached a number of authorities like the
panchayat members, officials and the local politicians. The farmers
who approached the local politicians did not bribe the officials
but others had to do so. The bribe was made either in the form
of cash alone or both cash and kind. This bribe in kind comprised
liquor in most of the cases. A large set of farmers in the
backward area gave bribes in both cash and kind whereas most
of the farmers of the progressive area bribed the officials only
with cash. A further exploration points out that those farmers
who did not use any sort of influence had to wait for a
relatively longer time to get the effective electricity connection
on their field after the completion of all the prerequisites on
their part. This finding reveals, in a sense, the correlation
between bribes and the tendency of the officials to do work at
the earliest.
V
Need for Policy Action
Demerits of Polarising Subsidy Benefits
Under state’s non-discriminatory electricity subsidy policy,
the farmers having economic and political power managed to
have an early access to electricity connections and consequently,
the surpluses arising from partial or full price concessions on
sale of electricity to the agricultural sector benefited only
these farmers. This trend has had a number of implications
for the agricultural sector. Some of these implications are dis-
cussed below:
Divided society into haves and have-nots: The state’s non-dis-
criminatory policy of granting electricity subsidy for irrigation
has caused large socio-economic disparities and divided the
agricultural society into the classes of haves and have-nots. The
haves possessing electricity connections with access to electricity
of relatively better quantity and quality (as farmers of the pro-
gressive area) are better than the have-nots who either do not
have access to electricity or are not getting its adequate supply
(as farmers of the backward area) both in quantity and quality.
It has been found that there exists a large gap in terms of the
cost of production between the haves and the have-nots (see
Appendix 2). This difference in the cost of production arises due
to the differences in the means by which the production is carried
out. Irrigation is one of the major inputs in the agricultural
production process. Owing to this, the ownership of electricity
connection by a farmer in the presence of subsidised electricity
has a significant bearing on her/his cost of production. The
availability of either free or partially priced electricity has
contributed towards increasing income inequalities within the
agricultural sector by making the irrigation cost almost nil for
the haves. But this is not the case for the have-nots or the haves
who have access to inadequate, unreliable and poor quality
electricity because, in the absence of access to reliable electricity,
these farmers have to irrigate their crops through the use of diesel
pump-sets. Such irrigation practices in the presence of very high
and continuously rising diesel prices impose a huge cost burden
on farmers for producing the same quantity of output. It is due
to this reason that the average cost of production has remained
quite low for the haves whereas it is relatively high for the farmers
in the other category. Given the same output price, this has
implications for net economic returns to both categories of farmers.
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Table 4: Willingness to Pay User Charges by Farmer Class in
the Progressive and Backward Areas
WTP Progressive Area Backward Area
Small Medium Large Total Small Medium Large Total
At 65 23 43 52 40 35
Metered rate (95.6)  (79.3)  (81.1)  131 (96.3) (78.4) (77.8) 127
At 3 6 10 19 2 11 10 23
Flat rate (4.4)  (20.7) (18.9) (3.7)  (21.6) (22.2)
Total 68 29 53 150 54 51 45 150
(100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100)
Note: The figures in parentheses are percentages of farmers within their
farmer class.
Source: Primary survey.
The haves continue to have higher net economic returns whereas
these returns from the sale of same output have been quite low
for the have-nots. All this leads to increasing income inequalities
in the society.
Left backward areas as subsidy losers: The state’s policy of
providing non-discriminatory electricity subsidy to the agri-
cultural sector has weakened the financial soundness of the
Punjab state electricity board. This affected the pace of irrigation
pump-set energisation that has shown a declining trend since the
1980s.14 A huge capital cost is involved in the expansion of new
electric wires, which are required for an effective electricity
connection on the farm. Under the conditions of the deteriorating
financial position of the board, an already existing network of
electric wires assumes significance. The availability of electric
lines in the vicinity of the farm is the minimum condition that
can ensure speedy electrification of irrigation pump-sets (IPS)
on that farm. The pump-sets in farms having passage of electric line
through their vicinity have a good chance of getting electrified.
We have seen that in the backward area, a larger percentage
(i e, 65 per cent compared to 14 per cent in the progressive area)
of the farms are not having an electricity connection. Compared
with the progressive area, a majority (80 per cent) of the farms
in the backward area do not have any chance of getting electrified
irrigation pumpsets in near future. The main reason for such a
low incidence of connection in the backward area is the relatively
poor network of electric lines. Here, no electric wire, not even
in the distance of 300-400 metres, have been observed to be
passing through the vicinity of most of the farms whereas the
situation is quite different in the other case due to the existence
of a better network of electric wires. This lack of access to the
basic infrastructure, essential to ensure the flow of electricity
supply to the fields of a large set of farmers in the backward
areas, leaves these farmers excluded in the sense that they cannot
dream of getting any benefit from the electricity subsidy even
in near future. The disparities between the two areas on account
of the flow of electricity subsidy in future will persist even if
we assume that all those who are having connection possibilities
will get an electricity connection on their farm. In such a case,
only 48 per cent of farmers in the backward area will be having
electrified irrigation pumpsets – much lower in comparison to
the 91 per cent in the progressive area. This implies that the
progressive area will remain a major beneficiary15 of the elec-
tricity subsidy in the near future, even if both areas experience
similar situation of electricity supply, which is not so.
Troubled sustainability of agriculture: The provision of non-
discriminatory electricity subsidy has had a negative impact on
the sustainability of agriculture as it has had implications for
depletion of underground water.16 The cheap availability of
electricity and credit have increased steeply the use of tube wells
for irrigation in Punjab. The number of electrically-operated tube
wells has increased from six lakh in 1990-91 to 7.5 lakh in 1999-
2000 [CMIE 2003]. The subsidised electricity sale has reduced
the marginal cost of irrigation to almost zero. It persuaded farmers
to over-irrigate their lands. It has been found that only 54.70 per
cent of the farmers applied 25 to 30 irrigations as per the water
requirements of the rice crop [Singh Amarjit 1998: 191]. This
reveals the non-optimal use of electricity and of the scarce
underground water resources by the farmers. The reckless use
of water through tube wells has caused the problems of under-
ground water depletion in some areas. The water table in the
central districts of Punjab has been going down at an average
rate of 0.23 metres per year. This rapid pace of underground water
depletion may trouble sustainability of Punjab’s agriculture.
There can be a temporary escape from this problem. But it will
cost more than Rs 2,000 crore or an additional expenditure of
Rs 5,000 per hectare along with a two-fold rise in energy con-
sumption due to replacement of present pump-sets by submersible
pumps in next 15 years [GoI 2003: 121].
The availability of this cheap mode of irrigation also persuaded
farmers in the backward area to shift to cultivation of water-
intensive crops like rice, from their old practices of growing
cotton. In this area 94.2 per cent of the farmers are growing rice
mainly due to subsidised electricity supply. This crop diversi-
fication has been a major factor for the depletion of groundwater
at a fast pace in this area because rice is a water-intensive
crop. Due to this, more extraction of water takes place than
the recharge through rain.17  The average level by which ground-
water depleted during the last five years in the backward area
has been estimated to be about 42 feet from the survey
data18 whereas in the progressive area, it has not depleted as much
(i e, by 22.5 feet). Given the same rate of water extraction, such
differing water depletion rates in the two areas have been
due to differences in recharging the aquifer through adequate
rainfall, etc.
VI
Scope for Policy Action
Possibilities on Demand-Side
Till now, we have noticed that the provision of electricity
subsidy rather than serving the expected purpose has had adverse
impacts. This calls for the need, from the policy perspective, to
explore alternatives to this policy. The demand-side provides one
possibility to explore such alternatives. The demand-side
consists of farmers – the largest interest group in Punjab’s politics
[Mukherji 1998] and given the literary evidence on the state’s
submission to the interest groups in the intermediate regimes (see
Section I), the exploration of possibilities on the demand side
assumes significance. We hypothesise that the farmers in Punjab
did not think seriously about the long-term impact of such subsidy
policy and were lured by political parties. But they may under-
stand well if they are made aware of the economics of supplying
electricity at their farms. On the basis of this notion, we asked
farmers their willingness to pay (WTP) user charges in two
different situations. In the first case, the electricity utility
operates under the full scope of state intervention and
influence and in the second case, it is made independent of any
state influence. The following sub-sections highlight
farmers’ response towards the payment of user charges in these
two hypothetical situations.
WTP under the veil of state influence: In the first situation, the
WTP user charges has been almost nil on the part of farmers.
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Most of them have simply refused to pay any user charges as
they know that the power utility in Punjab is under state ownership
and control and in the politics of numbers, they can influence
the state to get their demands fulfilled. A classification of our
sample size into two categories (viz, non-OYT and OYT) as per
the status of the IPS makes this finding quite interesting. The
non-OYT is the set of the farmers other than the farmers having
connections under the OYT scheme. We found that a majority
of the farmers in the non-OYT category and all the farmers in
the OYT category in the progressive area refused to pay any user
charges. Similar results have been found in the backward area
also. Along with changes in attitude towards payment of elec-
tricity charges due to their access to free electricity for the long
time, the farmers of both the areas have different reasons for their
reluctance to pay any user charge. In the progressive area where
the electricity availability is relatively better in both quantity as
well as quality, the farmers are not willing to pay merely because
they are getting electricity during odd hours (e g, at night). It
is very inconvenient to them and they want electricity during
the day time. The power utility supplies electricity to the agri-
cultural sector during the night (off-peak hours) because the
supply of electricity to the subsidised consumers during this time
imposes a smaller financial burden on the utility. The response
of farmers regarding the payment of user charges is nothing but
a reflection of their lobbying power. Such an attitude of using
the lobbying power has also been found, to some extent, in the
backward area but for most of the electrified IPS owners, the
availability of inadequate and poor quality electricity has been
the main reason for their reluctance to pay the electricity charges.
Another factor has been farmers’ belief that they can influence
the state through their vote bank and lobbying power. This belief
is obvious to get strengthened due to increasing political domi-
nance in electricity board’s affairs. This belief of farmers also
gets reflected in their disappointment with the removal of free
electricity supply and privatisation of the electricity board [Jain
2003]. But the question of seeking any diversion from the state’s
electricity subsidy policy needs an examination of farmers’ original
WTP user charges. So it becomes necessary to interview farmers
in a hypothetical situation where the power utility is kept inde-
pendent of political influence. Here, we told farmers that there
are no price concessions on the sale of electricity in this situation
but they will definitely be provided adequate, reliable and quality
electricity.
WTP under promise of adequate, reliable electricity availability:
Our survey results point out that a majority of the farmers, who
are unsatisfied with inadequate, unreliable electricity supply
under the subsidy regime, are willing to pay reasonable user
charges. Though some farmers are favouring flat rates, a majority
agreed to accept metered rate in both areas, provided the avail-
ability of quality electricity is ensured. The two areas differ on
account of IPS electrification. This makes one curious to know
whether these differences shaped farmers’ WTP user charges at
the metered rate. In the backward area, the non-electrified IPS
holders are more willing to pay user charges at metered rate than
their counterparts with electrified IPS holders. In the progressive
area, there is not much difference among both categories of
farmers (Table 4).
Focusing on the cases favouring metered electricity supply,
it can be seen that a majority of the farmers with non-electrified
pumpsets, in both the areas, made higher bids than those who
are already having electrified pumpsets. The farmers having
electrified pumpsets in the progressive area made the lowest bid
of Rs 0.50 per unit but the same has been Rs 1.50 for both
categories of farmers in the backward area (Table 5). However,
the minimum bid level of non-electrified pump-set owners in the
progressive area has been higher than their counterparts in the
backward area. This set of farmers also showed relatively more
Table 6: Distribution of Farmers (in Percentage) as Per Their WTP User Charges (Per kWh)
WTP(Rs) Progressive Area Backward Area
Electrified IPS Farmer Class Electrified IPS Farmer Class
Yes No Small Medium Large Yes No Small Medium Large
< = 0.50 15.4 - - 8.7 37.2 - - - - -
0.50-2.50 83.7 21.4 81.5 91.3 62.8 79.4 14.1 11.5 6 5 77.1
2.50-3.50 0.9 78.6 18.5 - - 1 9 78.1 80.8 32.5 2 0
> 3.50 - - - - - 1.6 7.8 7.7 2.5 2.9
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Primary survey.
Table 5: Summary Statistics for Payment of User Charges by IPS Electrification Status and Farmer Class
Differences in Progressive and Backward Areas
Progressive Area Backward Area
Summary Statistics Electrified IPS Farmer Class Electrified IPS Farmer Class
Yes No Small Medium Large Yes No Small Medium Large
Mean (Rs) 1.5 3.01 2.03 1.59 1.13 2.38 3.1 3.1 2.59 2.4
Standard deviation 0.54 0.45 0.61 0.52 0.56 0.5 0.51 0.48 0.62 0.53
CoV (per cent) 3 6 14.95 30.05 32.7 49.6 21.01 16.45 15.5 23.94 22.1
Minimum (Rs) 0.5 2.25 1.25 0.5 0.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Maximum (Rs) 2.75 3.5 3.5 2.5 2.5 4 4 4 4 4
Note: CoV = Coefficient of variation.
Source: Primary survey.
Table 7: Resource Inputs and Cost Estimates for a Single
Irrigation of One Acre of Land
Period Resources Needed Irrigation Cost (Rs)
Time Diesel Electri- Incurred Saved
(Hours) (Litres) city Diesel Electricity @PSEB’s @AWTP
(kWh)* @PSEB’s Ac@AWTP Ac
First
month 5 7 18.39 138.88 44.87 40.46 94.01 98.42
Next  2.5
months 3.5 5 12.87 99.20 31.40 28.31 67.80 70.89
Total 8.5 12 31.26 238.08 76.27 68.77 161.81 169.31
@ = at the rate of; AC = Average Cost; AWTP = Average Willingness to Pay.
Source: Primary survey.
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consistency in their bid levels. But, farmers in the backward area
made the highest bids of Rs 4 per unit. These relatively high bid
levels are due to the fact that farmers perceive other electric motor
substitutes (like diesel engines) as dearer and of poor quality.
A large proportion of farmers who made high bids are small
farmers of the backward area. On the contrary, a majority of the
medium and large farmers in the backward area made relatively
low bids. But, it has been better than the response of medium
and large farmers in the progressive area. A large group of these
farmers made bids not more than Rs 0.50 whereas their coun-
terparts kept the same at Rs 1.50 in the backward area. In some
cases, it has been even at Rs 4 per unit. This difference in bids
by the same class of farmers between the two areas may be due
to the difference in their experience of electricity supply at this
juncture. This along with the wish to enjoy the better conditions
of electricity supply at the farm might have persuaded farmers
of the backward area to make relatively higher bids (Table 6).
It can be observed that the rich farmers of the progressive area
who have a high capacity to pay have low WTP and the relatively
poor farmers of the backward area who have a low capacity to
pay have high WTP user charges if the electricity utility ensures
the availability of reliable and quality electricity. There are more
than one-third of large farmers in the progressive area who kept
their bid levels up to Rs 0.50 only. Therefore, there is a need
to evolve some sort of balancing strategy under these circum-
stances. However, the farmers’ unanimity regarding the payment
of user charges under conditions of reliable and quality electricity
supply is a healthy sign for the financially strapped electricity
utility in an agriculturally advanced state. But, even then, there
arise, in one’s mind, various queries like what are the economic
benefits on the farmers’ side. Will they be better off with will-
ingness-based payment of user charges? Will there be any in-
crease in their consumer surplus after this policy change? And
so on. These queries are the subject matter of the next section.
VII
Merits of Policy Change for the Farmers
The scenario of providing adequate, reliable and quality elec-
tricity supply ensures economic benefits on the demand side.
Farmers made an average bid at Rs 2.20 per unit. This bid level
is too high in comparison to the free availability of electricity.
But even then, we argue that this new scenario has its merit for
benefiting the farmers in terms of irrigation cost reduction. The
farmers will be able to reduce this cost even after paying elec-
tricity charges as per the average bid level. In order to arrive
at some meaningful estimates about the magnitude of avoidable
additional cost burden that the farmer has to incur due to her/
his dependence on the diesel pumpset, we focus on some water-
intensive crops like rice that is cultivated in both the areas. This
may facilitate the applicability of same results of avoidable cost
burden for both the areas. Since most of the small farmers in
the backward area (65 per cent) do not have electrified irrigation
pumpsets, the cost analysis can be made with respect to the
irrigation practices in this area. Also, it is better to confine the
analysis to the unit of per acre in order to get a good estimate
of the additional cost burden that a farmer has to bear following
his dependence on diesel pump-set.
It is better to know, before delving into the cost analysis, the
water needs of the rice crop along with the diesel or electricity
requirements for irrigating a single acre of land (Table 7). The
gestation period for the hybrid variety of the rice crop is 3.5 months.
Appendix 1
Table 1: Selected Socio-Economic Indicators of the Selected Districts
Variable Unit Mansa Ludhiana Punjab
2001 Rank 2001 Rank 2001
Agriculture
Cropping intensity - [176] 15 [195] 4 [187]
Net Irrigated area Per cent of net cropped area [88.0] 14 [100] 1 [94.5]
Number of tractors Per ‘000 hectares [43] 14 [90] 4 [63]
Agricultural workers Per cent of total workers 59.1 1 19.8 17 39.4
Industry
Number of units Per cent of total industrial units 1.38 16 21.23 1 100
Employment Per cent of total industrial employment 0.78 17 30.22 1 100
Investment Per cent of total industrial investment 0.22 17 21.46 1 100
Production Per cent of total industrial production 0.73 16 28.61 1 100
Human development, population and urbanisation
HDI - 0.633 17 0.761 1 -
Population density Per square kilometre 317 16 804 1 482
Urban population Per cent of total population 20.68 14 55.8 1 33.9
Urban population Per cent of total urban population 1.73 16 20.51 1 100
Note: Figures in the square brackets refer to year 1999; Ranks of all variables are calculated for corresponding years.
Source: Census of India: Punjab (2001); Government of Punjab (2002; 2004).
Appendix 2
Table 2: Electricity Status and Average Expenditure (Rs) on
Crops  (Per Acre)
Electricity Status Wheat Rice Cotton Sugar Cane
Availability of connection
the haves (progressive area) 3018.60 4279.48 - 4472.22
the have-nots (backward area) 3358.82 5621.87 6200 -
Non-availability of connection
the haves (progressive area) 3219.64 7800.25 - 6166.66
the have-nots (backward area) 3388.46 8017.85 6382.75 -
Source: Primary survey.
1980-85 1985-90 1990-95 1995-99 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Figure A: Growth Rate of Pump-set Energisation in Punjab
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The water needs of this variety of rice are more than those of
wheat or cotton crop. Also, these do not remain uniform through-
out its gestation period, rather there takes place some variation.
The crop of rice requires irrigation on every alternate day and
with a gap of three days during the first and the next 2.5 months,
respectively, i e, the rice crop needs irrigation for 15 times in
the first month and for 25 times in the subsequent 2.5 months.
This variation in irrigation needs affects the diesel and electricity
requirement for irrigating a single acre of land. The diesel pump-
set consumes about seven litres of diesel for irrigating a single
acre of land once during its five-hour long operation in the first
month and during next 2.5 months, it consumes about five litres
of diesel for irrigating the same plot of land. It takes 3.5 hours
during this time. The diesel requirements during the former
period are more than the latter period because usually in the initial
period, the summer season is at its peak and the water evaporation
takes place rapidly. Suppose if the same acre of land is irrigated
with an electric motor of five horse power (HP) capacity and
it takes the same time as the diesel pump-set to irrigate one acre
of land once during both periods, the continuous operation of
this electric motor for five hours and 3.5 hours during the first
month and the next 2.5 months will consume 18.39 kWh and
12.87 kWh of electricity, respectively.
This diesel pump-set based irrigation during both periods
involves a total cost of Rs 238, if the then current diesel price
of Rs 19.84 is considered. In case of electricity, we’ve estimated the
irrigation cost as per the electricity utility’s average cost, i e,
Rs 2.44 per kWh in 1999-2000 and the farmers’ average bid level
of Rs 2.20 per kWh. In the former case, the total cost of irrigating
a single acre of rice once is equal to Rs 76.27. It is Rs 68.77 during
the later period. From these estimates, it can be inferred that the
electricity-based irrigation is enabling a farmer to save more than
Rs 160 in the single irrigation of the crop. When this cost-saving
estimate is made for the entire gestation period of the rice crop,
it turns out to be within the range of Rs 3,100-3,250 – an amount
close to his average cost of producing wheat (see Appendix 2).
VIII
Summing-up
This paper highlights the electricity subsidy distribution pattern
in an agrarian state. Punjab being one of the agriculturally
advanced states provides a good example for examining dispari-
ties in the distribution of electricity subsidy. This paper devises
a new approach for examining the beneficiaries of electricity
subsidy. Earlier studies considered the magnitude of electricity
subsidy and based their findings on the (reported) agricultural
electricity consumption figures, whose authenticity can be doubted,
as agricultural electricity consumption is unmetered. Our study
devises a new approach and considers the direction of subsidy
benefits (rather than its magnitude) in assessing the electricity
subsidy flow disparities across different farmer classes within
the progressive and the backward areas of Punjab.
Our findings, revealing the comparative picture of the flows
of electricity subsidy benefits, are based on first-hand information
collected through a primary survey of 200 farm households in
the selected progressive and backward districts of Punjab. We
also surveyed another 100 households in both the districts to
capture the OYT connection holders to delve into the nature of
state’s electricity subsidy policy. Our results indicate the presence
of regional disparities regarding the flow of the electricity sub-
sidy. These differences are significant at 5 per cent level of
significance for almost all the indicators used to reflect the flow
of the electricity subsidy. The OYT scheme provided another
shock to the already existing disparities among different classes
of farmers. We found such a scheme to be a conscious move
of the state towards limiting the benefits of the subsidy regime
and the scarce undergroundwater to certain farmer classes. All
this contributed towards the division of Punjab’s agricultural
sector into the classes of haves and have-nots. It also affected
the sustainability of Punjab’s agriculture and left backward areas
as the subsidy losers. We also discussed farmers’ experience of
electricity availability under the subsidy regime and their will-
ingness to pay user charges both under the existing system and
the situation when the power utility, being independent of the
state influence, ensures the availability of adequate, reliable andquality
electricity to the agricultural sector. We found that the farmers are
willing to pay reasonable user charges irrespective of the regional
differences if the power utility fulfils its promise in the later
hypothetical scenario. Based on their average bid levels, we
estimated further the economic benefits that will accrue to farmers
in terms of reduction in the irrigation cost. This exercise was
done to see the economic incentive for the farmers to make a
choice between diesel-based irrigation and electricity-based
irrigation. The results have been positive as electricity-based
irrigation ensures savings, almost equal to the cost of cultivating
one acre of wheat! On the basis of this evidence, we put forward
the case for user charges-based open access to electricity to speed
up the pace of economic development of an agro-based economy
as this policy, apart from bringing hope for the sustainability of
the electricity utility, will ensure enough economic returns to the
farmers dependent on non-electrical means of irrigation.
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Notes
[This paper is based on the author’s MPhil research work completed during
2001-03 at the Centre for Development Studies under the supervision of K
P Kannan and N Vijayamohan Pillai. This is a revised version of the paper
presented at the Fourth International Convention of Asian Scholars, held at
Shanghai (China) during August 20-24, 2005. The author is thankful to the
participants for their comments. He is also thankful to the Indian Council
of Social Science Research (ICSSR) for providing  partial financial assistance
to attend this conference. The author is solely responsible for the errors, if any.]
1 Sreenivasamurthy and Bisaliah (1988) find that the adoption of mechanical
and bio-chemical innovations increased agricultural productivity by 52
per cent and 37 per cent, respectively whereas the remaining 11 per cent
increase in agricultural productivity took place through the interaction
between these two types of innovations.
2 Irrigation has played a significant role in raising the levels of agricultural
productivity by permitting the use of better seed-fertiliser combinations,
enabling productivity schedules to shift upwards along with increasing
employment elasticity of output by encouraging multiple cropping [Sen
1975].
3 Smith (1776) considers the provision of infrastructure along with defence
and justice as the important duties of the state. There exist differences
among economists regarding their approaches to fulfil this role of the
state. Nurkse (1961: 640-643) considers infrastructure as a “non-specific
initiatory pioneering type of investment” and argues for its creation ahead
of demand. But, others like Hirschman (1958) consider “ahead of demand”
creation of infrastructure as the wastage of scarce resources and argue
for its creation only in response to demand for it.
4 The market failure occurs due to the inability to define private ownership
rights for water as a resource. This inability results in (i) the non-formation
of a market price for water; (ii) the existence of externalities which are
caused due to the behavioural impact of individual user on collective access
to water, and (iii) a divergence between the private marginal costs and social
marginal costs of water provision for irrigation [Ellis 1992: 254].
5 Serious doubts have been raised in literature about the magnitude of
agricultural electricity consumption. It has been pointed out that the state
electricity boards dump a part of their losses into the unmetered electricity
supply to the agricultural sector [see Sant and Dixit 1996].
6 The political parties in Punjab did their best to win elections through
EPW
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populist measures. Since the late 1970s, the sale of electricity to the
agricultural sector was based on flat rate. But the political parties, in the
1990s, moved a step forward to attract the rural vote banks. The Congress
government under the leadership of Rajinder Kaur Bhattal in its populist
51-point programme announced to provide electricity free of any charge
to the farmers having either equal or less than seven acres of land.
Congress’ rival regional party, viz, Shiromani Akali Dal (Badal) also
“promised free power for tube wells, free canal water for irrigation” [Singh
1998: 235]. This regional political party kept its word on assuming the
office after having electoral victory in Punjab.
7 These two selected districts differ in terms of their socio-economic
development levels. Ludhiana – the land of green, white and blue revolutions
is more advanced on agricultural fronts than Mansa district. This is
reflected in terms of various agricultural performance indicators like
cropping intensity, net area irrigated, agricultural mechanisation and the
dependency of labour force on agriculture for livelihood (Appendix
Table 1). Ludhiana is much ahead of Mansa district on industrial fronts
also. The existence of the highest number of industries, industrial
employment, investment and production is a clear indication of Ludhiana’s
industrial achievements. Similarly, Ludhiana has performed well for
developing its infrastructure. This impact of the economic achievements
of the two districts is clearly revealed by their respective Human
Development Index. As expected, Mansa did the worst even in this respect
whereas Ludhiana continues to hold the top position throughout Punjab.
The economic achievement of a region also affects the density of population
and urbanisation due to their relation with rising per capita income levels.
Ludhiana, by the Census 2001, ranks first for having the highest population
density whereas Mansa district comes at the 16th rank. The level of
urbanisation too is at the highest level in Ludhiana.
8 The existing literature relates positively the benefits arising from electricity
subsidy to the land ownership [Reddy 1992; Karnik and Lalvani 1996;
Howes and Murgai 2003]. It points out that a large part of this subsidy
goes to large and medium farmers whereas small farmers remain at large
the non-beneficiaries.
9 Sangha, Ahlupur, Kahnewala and Jhanda Kalan were the four villages
selected in the Mansa district. These villages fall within the jurisdiction
of the Sardulgarh subdivision. In the Ludhiana district, we took Sudhar
and Mullanpur as the representative study areas. Both of these towns were
situated in the neighbourhood of the Ludhiana district. In Mansa district,
we had surveyed households having electricity connections under the
OYT scheme in villages of Bhunder, Jhanduka, Sangha and Sardulewala
after collecting information from the Sardulgarh and Jhunir substation.
The surveyed villages were Bharowal Kalan, Bhundri, Birmi, Dakha,
Fadla, Gorahoor, Majri, Mandeaani, Nurpur Veit, Pdain, Ranke, Sidhvan
Veit, Svadi Kalan and Talwandi Khurd in the Ludhiana district. These
villages were concentrated around the substations of Hambdhan and
Mullanpur.
10 The ownership of landholding can be taken as a proxy to capture varying
levels of interest group strength but, as the landownership data may be
defective due to under-reporting, we relied upon Punjab’s operational
landholding statistics.
11 An official assigned with the job of keeping all land records of a village.
12 During the primary survey, farmers have disclosed that they have to pay
bribes to the electricity board officials to get permission for the use of
stabilisers.
13 See e g, Bathla (1997).
14 For more discussion on problems involved in mobilising loans from the
institutional sources in Punjab, see Gill (2004).
15 The growth rate of pump-set energisation has fallen drastically from the
9.26 per cent during 1980-85 to 1.56 per cent during the 1995-99 (see
Figure A in Appendix 2).
16 Recently, the state has withdrawn its free electricity supply policy but
electricity sale to agriculture is still subsidised. It is supplied at a certain
fixed price. Given non-economic factors, this policy is likely to continue.
17 The depletion of underground water as a threat to Punjab’s agriculture
has been recognised long back, see e g, Joshi and Tyagi (1991); Surender
Singh (1991); Baldev Singh (1992); B D Dhawan (1993).
18 The degree of rainfall in this backward area is relatively low as this area
falls into the dry zone of Punjab.
19 These estimates are based on approximate levels of groundwater as told
by the farmers during the survey. No scientific technique has been applied
to measure the actual level of groundwater.
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